이스라엘의 F-35 도입 관련 贊反 의견 소식...

 

이스라엘이 총액 약 27억불 규모로 19대의 F-35 를 구입하고자 한다는 소식은 앞서 전한 바 있습니다. 이러한 이스라엘의 F-35

구입 계획에 대해서, 이스라엘 軍 퇴역 장성들간에 벌어지고 있는 도입 찬반 주장들을 소개한 AW&ST 의 기사를 소개합니다.

 

AW&ST 는 지난 주 F-35 도입을 포함한 이스라엘의 국방 정책과 관련된 특집 기사를 다룬 바 있으며, 그 중 F-35 관련 기사를

아래 소개합니다.

 

이스라엘 육군 출신의 예비역 소장은, 1기당 도입 단가가 약 1억6천만불에 이를 것으로 예상되는 F-35 도입을 포기하고, 기존

F-15 와 F-16 의 성능개량과 정밀 유도 무기의 확충을 통해 비정규전에 대항하는 것이 효과적이라는 주장 입니다.

 

반면, 이스라엘 공군 출신의 예비역 중장은 최소 수량이라 하더라도, 5세대 스텔스 전투기, F-35 의 확보를 통한 적 중심/종심

부를 정밀 타격할 수 있는 능력을 확보해야 한다는 주장 입니다.

 

지난 주 기사입니다만, 육군 및 공군 출신 예비역 장성들이 각각의 관점에서 주장하는 것으로 이해되는 기사로 보여집니다.

 

또한 아래 기사 후반부에는 이스라엘이 강력히 희망하고 있는 자국산 EW 장비의 F-35 장착 문제도, 미국측 입장에서는 거의

수용하기 어려운 문제로 언급하고 있습니다. 그리고 4세대 전투기를 5세대 스텔스 전투기, F-35 로 대체하는 과정에 있어서도

기존 4세대 전투기 물량 대비 5세대 스텔스 전투기의 물량 축소 확보에는 반대 한다는 예비역 공군 중장의 언급도 덧 붙이고

있습니다.

 

앞서 설명한 바와 같이, 이스라엘 역시 F-35 Lightning II 라는 고가의 장비를 도입함에 있어 각 군별로 가지고 있는 의견들이

예비역 장성들의 말을 통해 표현되고 있는 것이 아닌가 생각됩니다.

 

이스라엘의 F-35 19대 구입과 관련된 이스라엘 집권 내각의 1차 결정은 8월중 (금주 중) 으로 이루어 질 것으로 예상됩니다.

 

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Israel Debates F-35

Officials question whether the cost is worth the aircraft’s deterrent value

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 08/09/2010

Author : David A. Fulghum

 

­Whether Israel buys the Lockheed Martin F-35 in substantial numbers is still a “very delicate subject,” according to senior officials in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

 

Advocates stress its deterrent effect and the demands of conventional warfare. Detractors point to high cost, a tight defense budget and the likelihood that foreseeable conflicts will be fights against guerrillas and terrorists.

 

Critics contend that the money, estimated at $2.75 billion for the first 19 aircraft, could be better spent on upgrading conventional aircraft with high-speed stealthy weapons and sensors with the range to support such attacks. The frugal faction believes that attack helicopters and intelligence-gathering aircraft should be developed with a similar formula — existing airframes and advanced sensors. Israel plans to buy at least 19 F-35s, but the fleet may not grow much beyond that.

 

The compromise position may be an Israeli air force (IAF) that flies far fewer Joint Strike Fighters than had been planned.

 

“The [shrinking] force structure problem points us toward fewer but more sophisticated platforms,” says Air Force Lt. Gen. (ret.) Dani Halutz, former chief of the Israel Defense Forces. “The F-35 fits this trend exactly. If its performance is as advertised, it will allow us to cope with a shrinking budget and force size. It also could permit development of an operationally useful combination of stealthy and nonstealthy aircraft. They could pave the way for conventional aircraft in extreme operational situations.

 

“We should be using single aircraft or two-ship formations instead of the standard four-ship,” Halutz says. “We have to think of ways to change some structural habits and traditions that will make better use of equipment because it is more costly, and we can’t afford to stay with the old concepts.”

 

Moreover, he adds, Israel must never underestimate the ability of its foes to defend themselves and to acquire evermore sophisticated weapons.

 

“When you are fighting terrorist groups, there are unlimited options,” Halutz says. one such avenue is buying the most advanced, Russian-made SA‑18 and SA-24 shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons that are now on the black market (AW&ST Jan. 18, p. 18). The price tag of the F-35 is a major point of contention.

 

“The cost is huge and there are other needs,” says Army Maj. Gen. (ret.) ­Giora Eiland, who is a former head of the national security council of Israel and the current chairman of a committee investigating the flotilla incident off the coast of Gaza. “If we continue to use the very advanced [versions of the] F-16 and F-15 and upgrade some of the systems, we could save so much money that we could buy other important systems like ground-based missiles. And you can use more [air-launched] standoff weapons because they have extreme precision and a very long effective range.”

 

Some Israelis believe that national security trumps price.

 

“No responsible person will take the conventional war out of the equations,” Halutz says. “The highest chances for that kind of campaign are mainly in the Middle East. only here do traditional forces still exist. I think the nature of war is changing, so we have to adopt a more accurate, precision [strike] force concept and build up a more balanced force structure. I’ve seen a process in which the role of airpower changed from support of the land forces to a force with a major role in long-range operations.

 

“I think the F-35 is mandatory for the IAF,” Halutz adds. “How many is another issue. What do advanced airplanes mean to the rest of the fleet? They pull the rest of the fleet up by creating a new culture, doctrines and concepts of operations.”

 

Not everyone agrees, however.

 

Eiland points to the Boeing AH-64 helicopter as an example of “old-think” when compared to the product of a more flexible acquisition. The Apache is old, maintenance-dependent and equipped with outdated equipment, he says. In contrast, the Boeing MD-902 Explorer light-utility helicopter sells for about $5 million. The difference in long-cycle costs for the Explorer is about 10% of the aging Apache’s.

 

“You put on the most advanced electronic warfare system to protect it and the most advanced night vision systems,” Eiland says. “The only advantage of the Apache is slightly long range.”

 

Intelligence aircraft are in a similar category. About 30 years ago they cost $100 million each, had crews of 30 or more and required a large four-engine-transport airframe.

 

“Today you can buy the Beechcraft 350 or similar aircraft for about $6-7 million new or $2 million used,” Eiland says. “The platform is not important.”

 

The revolution in the effectiveness and size of intelligence systems — electro-optical, communications and signals intelligence, and radar — allows “you to have a very sophisticated, integrated intelligence system on a very simple, small and cheap aircraft,” he says. “You can get 80% effectiveness for 10% of the cost of big, military-specification aircraft.”

 

Both advocates and critics agree that warfare has evolved and that the military has not kept up with those changes.

 

“The military tends to be conservative,” Eiland says. “When circumstances change, there is a degree of failure in understanding and adapting new weapons systems to the situation. The platforms are becoming less important, while the equipment installed in them is becoming more critical. And the equipment is less expensive than the platform, especially if you can choose exactly what you want and not pay for what you don’t need.”

 

This sentiment will be played out as Israel jockeys to put its own computer codes and hardware into intelligence fusion and electronic attack systems on the F-35. So far, the U.S. has refused to allow any customization. Israeli officials say they are still working toward a compromise that may be part of an industrial participation package. Officials at the Farnborough air show estimated that the U.S. is offering $4 billion in F-35 work (AW&ST July 26, p. 41). U.S. officials also continue to tell Aviation Week that the electronic warfare and radar systems are so tightly integrated that it would be almost impossible to insert an Israeli-built replacement EW system. Israeli planners point out that the threats that the IAF will face are very specific and different from what a U.S. system will normally confront. Tailoring of EW and radar systems will be critical, IAF planners contend.

 

An attraction of the fifth-generation F-35, with its stealth and supercruise features, is that each aircraft will be able to replace more than one fourth-generation aircraft. But those who have analyzed such needs say there must not be too much force-structure reduction.

 

“Even the most sophisticated machine can’t be two places at once, so there is still a need for critical mass,” Halutz says. “The trend is to squeeze the force size below the numbers you need to create the necessary impact on the battlefield.”

 

Part of the solution will be to develop new formation and organizational structures. There is also a need to reconsider the role of special forces.

 

“We should think about new combinations of multi-discipline units,” Halutz says. “I don’t think we’re ready to combine stealthy, conventional, manned and unmanned aircraft yet because there are huge gaps in performance right now. But looking ahead 20-30 years, we can see different combinations. We have to think of new ways to integrate different elements that offer operational planners more options.”

 

 

  F-35A Lightning II (AF-03) ⓒ Lockheed Martin