Lockheed Martin F-35 JSF 의 [거짓과 진실]...

 

지난 5월 24일 미 하원 군사위원회(軍事委員會) 小委 청문회 질의/답변 과정에서 정리된 F-35 JSF 관련 내용입니다.

원문에서는 [Myths v. Facts] 로 표현을 했습니다만 굳이 풀어서 설명하자면, [JSF 에 대해서 잘못 알고 있는 점]

혹은 [믿음과 현실], 이런 의미로 이해하면 되겠습니다.

 

아래 원문에서 노란 바탕의 글은 미 국방성과 제작사 Lockheed Martin 그리고 JSF Team 이 신앙처럼 여기는 내용

이며, 파란색의 글은 근거를 동반한 사실적 관계, 그리고 빨간색 글은 현재 상황을 설명해 주는 내용입니다.

 

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Joint Strike Fighter Information

Myths v. Facts

Office of the Secretary of Defense

May 17, 2010

HASC Staff – Counterpoint

May 24, 2010

 

 

 

MYTH: Having an alternate engine will provide competition that will drive down costs.

 

FACT:  The alternate engine would still require a further investment of $2.9 billion and there is no guarantee that having two engines will create significant enough long-term savings to outweigh the additional costs and the burden of maintaining two logistical systems.  In the middle of two wars, DoD has other higher priority uses for $2.9 billion.

 

REALITY:

·        “Ashton Carter [The Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics] says he wants to promote as much competition as possible…Carter says he ‘wishes’ there was more competition in the industrial base.” (Aerospace Daily, 9-8-9).  The Pentagon’s current acquisition strategy for the F-35 engine is to provide a sole source contract for over $100 billion for one contractor for 30 or more years.

·        The Pentagon’s own analysis concludes that a dual source competitive engine program is likely to not cost more than a sole source, 30+ year contract for the F135 engine.  To fund the alternate engine for the next fiscal year, for an airplane that could comprise 95 percent of the U.S. fighter force, requires 8/100ths of one percent of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) base budget -- and is estimated to be recouped over the program’s lifespan.  The Pentagon’s 2007 plan to begin competitive procurement of the F135 and F136 engines in fiscal year 2014 has now moved to 2017 because of F-35 development aircraft production and testing delays.  $2.9 billion is a 6 year estimate that is largely driven by the Pentagon unjustifiably linking the F136 competitive engine development to the F-35 program testing and production delays. 

·        The Competition in Contracting Act (section 2304 of title 10, United States Code) requires competition in contracting, and section 202 of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires acquisition strategies to ensure competition throughout the life cycle of a weapon system.

·        The $485 million for the competitive engine in the fiscal year 2011 NDAA for the F-35 is not additive to the defense budget and it does not come out of the overall F-35 base funding requested by the Administration.  The funds for this program come from programs canceled by the Pentagon since the budget request was submitted to Congress, from programs that have been delayed and no longer need as high of funding as required, and from programs that are of lesser priority.

 

 

 

MYTH: There is significant operational risk in having a fleet that could be entirely grounded with a single engine problem.

 

FACT: The Department currently maintains two tactical aircraft programs, the F-22A and the F-18, which utilize a single source engine provider. Both programs have enviable safety records, and DoD is satisfied with the engines for both programs. Over the years, significant advancements in engine design, testing, and production have enabled DoD to manage the risks associated with single engine systems without having to ground an entire fleet.

 

REALITY:

·        The F-18 has three different engines for its various models.

·        The F-22 was too small a buy to benefit from a competitive engine program.

·        The large projected size of the F-35 program, a total of 3,173 U.S. and International aircraft, allows for competition to reduce engine costs and operational risk – at no additional cost – according to the Pentagon’s own study.  Competition is the hallmark of DoD acquisition policy, and is required by statute.

·        Pentagon talking points for The President, May 7, 2009: “The Defense Department is already pleased with the engine it has.  The engine it has works.”  However…

o       The most senior civilian acquisition official in the Air Force stated in a memo to Pentagon acquisition officials on April 19, 2009:   “F135 engine cost growth is an ongoing concern.”

o       The most senior civilian acquisition official in the Department of Defense, July 2009:  “These costs [on the primary F-35 engine] are outside the bounds of Selected Acquisition Report projections, and I am concerned about continued cost growth in the F135.” 

o       The Director of the F-35 Program Office, June 2009:  “The Pentagon needs to carefully consider the operational risk of having just one engine for the F-35 fighter jet…competition could bring faster technology development and lower costs…a single engine could be worrisome if an engine problem ever grounded the fighters…In the past, having a variety of fighters meant the Pentagon could use other planes to offset any groundings, like an 11- month engine-related halt in Harriers in 2000…I simply think that we’ve focused too much on the discussion about cost benefit and not the operational risk benefit.” 

o       The F-35 engine is being required to do what no other fighter engine has ever been required to do – in addition to providing thrust for high speed, high g flight, the F-35B requires the engine to power a lift fan for vertical landings.  Both significant ground test cell failures of the F135, one in 2007 and one in 2008 occurred in this test mode. 

 

 

 

MYTH: There has never been an engine competition for the Joint Strike Fighter.

 

FACT: In 1996 competitive contracts were awarded to Boeing and Lockheed Martin for the Concept Development phase of the JSF program, with a single contractor to be selected for the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase in 2001. Both contractors selected a variant of the Pratt &Whitney F119 engine as their propulsion system. Lockheed Martin maintained their selection of the P&W engine when they were awarded the EMD/Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract in 2001.

 

REALITY:

·        There “has never been an engine competition for the Joint Strike Fighter” engine.

·        Secretary Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, March 24, 2010:  “Pratt & Whitney [F135] was awarded a non-competitive SDD contract for the F135 propulsion system” in 2001.

·        Secretary Kaminski, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, November 15, 1996, Joint Strike Fighter Milestone 1, Acquisition Decision memorandum:  “A sole source [non-competitive] contract will be awarded to Pratt & Whitney [F135] to provide hardware and engineering support for the [F-35] Weapons System Concept Demonstration efforts…In an effort to realize potential production cost savings, a sole source contract will also be awarded to GE for  technical efforts to develop an F120 derivative alternate engine [F136] for production.”

·        November 2000 JSF Acquisition Strategy document

o       Pg. 34: "The JSF program includes funds for the EMD phase and the production phase of the JSF119 [F135] propulsion system as well as funding for an alternative engine development program…In the production phase, there will be periodic engine competitions.  This competitive engine environment will ensure long-term industrial base support with two production lines and will keep JSF engine costs down and reliability up…While the existing and near term industrial base is adequate to support the EMD and Production phases of the JSF program, DOD is concerned about the potential long-term effects of the current JSF "winner take all" acquisition strategy.  It is hard to determine if there will be sufficient non-JSF opportunities to keep the losing JSF contractors' design capabilities and production lines in business.

o       Pg. 35:   “The air systems contractor will rely on competition to obtain best value for all air system components, subsystems, and production and support to ensure affordability throughout the life of the program.  Propulsion system EMD contracts will be awarded to Pratt & Whitney and General Electric; however, General Electric and Pratt & Whitney will begin competing for "core" engine production in FY 11.

o       From Attachment #1 titled: "JSF Program Propulsion System Acquisition Strategy for the Engineering and Manufactruing Development Phase" of the approved and signed November 2000 JSF Acquisition Strategy document:

 

"The JSF Program propulsion system acquisition strategy includes the design, development, qualification and production of a primary and alternate propulsion system to support the JSF air system.

 

"The decision to procure and provide propulsion systems as government furnished equipment during the JSF Concept phase and again during the EMD phase was threefold.  First, the air and propulsion system contractors concurred that the U.S. Government has the technical expertise to oversee successful development and qualification of turbofan-based propulsion systems.  Second, the U.S. Government involvement prevents the Air System Contractor from levying unreasonable requirements on the Propulsion System Contractors, or unreasonably reducing propulsion system development funding to resolve air system funding shortfalls.  Finally, the U.S. Government needs more in-depth and earlier insight into the propulsion system because it is traditionally a higher risk part of a tactical aircraft development program.

 

"The contract strategy for the JSF 119 [F135] propulsion system entails awarding a single, sole-source Cost-Plus contract to Pratt & Whitney, concurrent with the contract award for the JSF air system.  The contract will include the development and qualification of the primary propulsion systems; development and delivery of "common" hardware to General Electric; support and training system development; and procurement of flight test support for the JSF air system and the F120 [F136] (alternate) propulsion system.  Pratt & Whitney will complete propulsion system development in FY-08, but will continue to support the JSF air system and F120 [F136] flight test programs through FY-11.

 

"The contract strategy for the JSF F120 [F136] propulsion system entails awarding a single, sole-source Cost-Plus contract to General Electric following completion of current alternate engine pre-EMD activities.  This contract will include engine development and integration of "common" hardware as well as qualification of the alternate propulsion systems; support and training system development; and procurement of flight test support for the JSF air system.  The General Electric contract will be awarded in FY-05 and conclude following flight test activities in FY-11."

 

 

 

MYTH:  The  level of concurrency in the program creates too much risk.

 

FACT: The JSF Program was initially approved with a high level of concurrency that was determined to be an acceptable balance of risk, due to lessons learned from past programs, improvements in design techniques, increased use of modeling and simulation, and the requirement to provide 5th generation replacement strike fighter aircraft to the Services to replace aging and costly legacy aircraft.

 

The restructure established a plan to effectively balance service inventory requirements, unit cost affordability objectives, and concurrency concerns by:

 

          Procuring fewer aircraft during the development phase (concurrency) than originally planned at Milestone B in 2001;

          Procuring aircraft over the FYDP at cost and on a schedule consistent with recommendations from JET II   and

         Independent Manufacturing Review Team;

          Delaying the Full Rate Production decision (Milestone C) until completion of Initial Operational Test and Evaluation; and

                Actively pursuing a transition to a Fixed Price contract structure as soon as possible. A Fixed Price contract places

        more  of the cost risk associated with design changes to the production aircraft on the contractor, not the government,

        lessening some of the cost risk associated with concurrency.

                          

REALITY:

Statements made by Department of Defense officials after the JSF restructure:

 

Secretary Carter:  “And just as a remind[er], JSF has an unprecedented amount of concurrency -- so-called in the program -- that is a period of time in which development activities are still continuing in testing, even as production begins…The level of concurrency is unprecedented.  It is reduced as a result of these actions…The concurrency that remains in the program, though less, is worrying, has to be managed.  The theory of the case here was and is a perfectly reasonable one in general, was that we have gotten to the point now in modeling and simulation that we should be able to confidently enter production before we have completed testing fully.  That's the theory of the case that's been with the Joint Strike Fighter program from the very beginning.  Unprecedented, and we have found that in some respects that aspiration so far in the program has not always been achieved.  That's why we're trying to take some of the aggressiveness out of the program at this point.  But it's still aggressive.”   (March 11, SASC)

 

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (Mike GILMORE):  “Of the level of concern -- concurrency I think is still unprecedented in these kinds of programs, will plot even with the reduction of the production ramp, will plot more aircraft here at a given point in time since the beginning of flight testing as we did, for example, in the F-16 Program where we bought a couple of thousand aircraft.”  (March 11, SASC)

 

Director, Cost Analysis and program Assessment (Christine Fox): “One of the leverage points we actually have on the contractor is that ramp. They want to push the ramp up, get the unit cost down and push jets out.  We are holding them back based on the analysis we've done, the review of the Independent Manufacturing Review Team, and the desire to keep pressure on this unprecedented concurrency.”  (March 11, SASC)

 

 

 

MYTH: The second engine is 70% complete and only needs an additional $1.3 billion over the next five years.

 

FACT: The alternate engine would still require a further investment of $2.9 billion [over the next six years]. Some have suggested that the necessary additional investment is much less; however, they are only looking at the cost to complete development of the second engine. The investment of $2.9B includes the costs to finish the development, conduct directed buys to prepare the second source for competitive procurement beginning in FY 2017, and create the necessary logistics support to operate and sustain engines on deployed F-35 aircraft. In short, $2.9B is the total additional cost required to take the alternate engine to full competition. The $1.3 billion figure only gets you part way there.

 

REALITY

·        $2.9 billion is a six year estimate that is largely driven by the Pentagon artificially linking the F136 competitive engine development to the F-35 program testing and production delays, which has again been slipped because of testing and development delays.  The DoD 2007 plan to begin competitive procurement of the F135 and F136 engines in fiscal year 2014 has been changed until 2017 because of F-35 development aircraft production and testing delays.  To fund the alternate engine for the next fiscal year for an airplane that could comprise 95 percent of the U.S. fighter force requires 8/100ths of one percent of DoD’s base budget. 

 

 

 

MYTH: The second engine will not require a redesign in the future.

 

FACT: It is premature to declare the F136 will not require a redesign in the future. In fact, most engines do require at least minor redesigns prior to initial service release configuration. In addition, all engines undergo continuous design changes as part of the Component Improvement Program. Funding for a second Component Improvement Program would have to be provided for a second engine.

 

REALITY:

Every engine is “redesigned” continually during its lifetime in the development stage and in the production phase through the component improvement program (CIP).  That is what innovation is all about and was one of the great achievements in the first alternate engine program as derivatives of the F100 and F110 were developed through the years.

 

 

 

MYTH: The Great Engine War saved the F-16 program 21% in overall costs, therefore having an extra engine for the JSF will save the government $1 billion over the next five years, and $20 billion over the life of the program.

 

FACT: Many proponents of a second engine cite the “Great Engine War” of the 1980s – when the DoD purchased engines for Air Force F-15 and F-16 fighters from two manufacturers. While much has been made of this example, the facts tell a more nuanced and inconclusive story. While the competition did appear to improve contractor responsiveness to Air Force needs, there were only minimal reductions in the acquisition unit price of the engines. Accordingly, it is difficult to cite this example as proof that substantial savings will occur as a result of having two engines.

 

REALITY:

The Pentagon was asked, months ago, when OSD/PA first made this point, to provide the facts that “tell a more nuanced and inconclusive story” and has yet to do so.  The GAO concluded in its 2007 study of F-35 engine options that the Air Force achieved a 21 percent savings by competing the F100 and F110 engines.

 

 

 

MYTH: The international JSF partners strongly support having two engines.

 

FACT: Some of the international partners are interested in establishing potential national workshare programs in production and maintenance if a second engine is pursued.  However, they recognize that the U.S. alone would have to fund the remaining R&D costs under the JSF System Development and Demonstration Memorandum of Understanding. They also understand that allocating future R&D money to complete a second JSF engine would divert much needed funds from more pressing DoD priorities.

 

REALITY:

The fact is that because there was an alternate engine for the F-15 and F-16, eight countries own both engines, benefiting the U.S. industrial base.  The cost of continued U.S procurement and CIP programs is shared between the U.S. and international partners.

 

 

 

MYTH: The fighter engine industrial base will be significantly downgraded unless two contractors participate in the JSF program.

 

FACT: It is far from certain that ending the F136 program will lead to a reduction in the number of suppliers for JSF engine spare parts. A 2007 Institute of Defense Analysis study examined the top F-136 component suppliers and concluded that it is "unlikely that any supplier would exit the domestic industrial base because of F136 termination". A number of these suppliers will likely maintain significant capacity through their commercial efforts.

 

REALITY:

DOD Defense Contract Management Agency 2008 “Fighter Engine Industrial Base Assessment:

 

Summary and Recommendations: 

 

At completion of F135 and F136 SDD programs the U.S. will be without a major fighter engine development program for the first time in 35 years:  No defined requirements for nextgen or derivative engines; CIP funding inadequate to sustain [industrial] base; and preliminary data suggests a quick erosion of engineering skills and infrastructure will occur.

 

Ensure F136 production is reinstated under FY06 schedule (i.e., production deliveries support LRIP Lot 4[FY10])

 

 

 

MYTH: The second engine is not very far behind. It will start production after only 100 of the current engines are produced.

 

FACT: A direct comparison shows that the F136 Initial Service Release (ISR) dates are at least 2-3 years behind the F135 ISR dates. The F135 Conventional Take-off and Landing/Carrier Variant achieved its ISR date in February 2010, and the same ISR date is planned for the F136 in December 2012. The planned F-135 Short Take-off and Vertical Landing ISR date is fourth quarter of FY10 and the same ISR date for the F136 is planned for fourth quarter FY13. There is also no guarantee that a second engine program will not face the same challenges as the current program has already faced and be forced to delay its own program.

 

REALITY:

The SDD contract for the F136 was signed 46 months after the SDD contract for the F135 engine.  Having been initiated 2 months short of 4 years later than the F135 engine program, for the F136 to be 2-3 years behind the F135 is a good news story.  It is disingenuous, at best, for senior OSD officials to continually make the point that the F136 is four years behind the F135 when that has been the engine acquisition strategy for F-35 engines since the start of F-35 SDD in 2001.

 

 

  ⓒ USAF

 

  ⓒ USAF