캐나다는 F-35A 구입을 포기하고 Saab Gripen NG 를 구입해야 한다

 

 

 

Why Canada Should Buy The Saab JAS39 Gripen E "Next Generation" Fighter

Postmedia News (Canada), 01/07/2013

Author : David Pugliese

Copyright © 2013 Postmedia News (Formerly known as Canwest News Service.)

 

Editor's note: Defence Watch reader Kyle Meema has researched alternatives to the F-35. In a two-part series running Monday and Tuesday he argues that Canada should purchase the Gripen fighter aircraft.

 

By Kyle Meema

Defence Watch Guest Writer

 

Part one:

 

Candidates: The Various Alternatives

 

Contrary to the assertions of politicians and officials^[1], there are several viable alternatives to the F-35A. The Rafale, Eurofighter, Next Generation Gripen, and F/A-18E Super Hornet are all very capable fighter jets that could serve Canada very well.

 

While the Rafale performs very well, it is hindered by its incompatibility with most NATO standard weapons, which Canada stockpiles. This means that Canada would be dependent on French munitions and our existing weapons could not be used. But for this compatibility issue, the Rafale would be a very strong contender. Though still a very capable fighter, the Super Hornet is also not the best of these alternatives due to an antiquated air frame and a relatively low top speed of mach 1.8. The two most promising alternatives are the Next Generation Gripen and the Eurofighter.

 

Saab has three versions of its JAS39 Gripen fighter jet. Of those models, I propose that Canada procure the "NG" ("Next Generation", also known as the E/F) model that is currently in development and scheduled to be introduced in 2017^[2]. It is the third generation of the Gripen fighter. Based on the Gripen C/D airframe, the NG Gripen will have new and improved sensor technology, fuel capacity, engine, and potentially thrust vectoring. It is to the Gripen C/D what the F/A-18E/F is to the F/A-18A/B. It is a very capable fighter and the ideal candidate to replace Canada's aging CF-18s.

 

*Note: As the NG Gripen is still being tested, some of the information in this article refers to the Gripen C/D performance. The NG Gripen is designed to match or beat the C/D in terms of performance and cost.

 

Narrowing Down The Alternatives: Gripen vs Eurofighter vs F-35A

 

Factor 1: Cost

 

The cost-to-performance ratio is what makes the Gripen so appealing. The Gripen C/D has very similar performance and technology of the Eurofighter, but comes at half the price. The Gripen costs $60 million per plane^[3] whereas the latest Eurofighter costs $125 million per plane.^[4] The F-35A, by contrast, is currently projected to cost $107 million per plane by 2017^[5]. However, the Canadian government currently projects initial procurement costs for 65 F-35As at $9 billion^[6], putting the initial procurement cost at $138 million per plane. That same $9 billion would buy 150 Gripens or 72 Eurofighters. This ambiguity in the true cost of the F-35A makes projections difficult, leading to uncertainty. However, whatever the true cost is, it will be enormous and not reflective of the F-35A's limited capabilities. In terms of initial procurement cost, the Gripen is the clear winner.

 

Not only are the initial procurement costs of the Gripen low, it is also the least expensive modern fighter jet to operate at approximately $4,700 per flight hour^[7]. Conversely, the Eurofighter costs $18,000 per flight hour^[8] and the F-35A costs an enormous $21, 000 per flight hour.^[9]

 

A fleet of 65 F-35As is currently projected to cost Canada $45.8 billion^[10] over the course of a 40+ year lifespan. If $9 billion is to actually purchase the planes, then the operating costs for a fleet of 65 F-35As for 40+ years will be approximately $36.8 billion. The Eurofighter's operating costs are 85%^[11] that of the F-35A , therefore the operating costs of a fleet of 72 Eurofighters over 40+ years would be approximately $34.6 billion^[12]. The Gripen's operating costs are 15%^[13] that of the F-35A, therefore the operating cost of a fleet of 150 Gripens for 40+ years would be approximately $12.7 billion^[14]. In terms of operational cost, the Gripen is the clear winner.

 

Despite the fact that these figures are estimates and will likely vary, the massive gap between the F-35A, Eurofighter, and the Gripen are difficult to ignore. The Gripen and Eurofighter cost projections are likely to be closer to reality given that it they are based on proven systems with much more fight time. There is no real world combat date on the F-35A and its true cost for Canada can only climb higher, particularly given issues such as the F-35A's incompatibility with certain weapons and Canada's CC-150 Polaris refuelling tankers, which are examined later.

 

Part problem with the Eurofighter and F-35A is that their dramatically higher costs do not translate into a proportional increase in performance and capability. The Gripen, however, has performance very nearly equal to the Eurofighter, but comes at half the cost. Even though the shortfall in performance is, as will be examined later, negligible, the money saved by procuring the Gripen could be put towards arming Canada's Gripen fleet with the best weapons available, providing Canadian Gripen pilots with the best training, and leave room for future upgrades as technology improves. This, along with the increase in the sheer numbers of Gripen fighters Canada could purchase, would more than make up for the negligible shortfall in performance or capability. The F-35A, by comparison, is a relatively poor performer.

 

Other countries are rethinking their commitments and re-evaluating their options, such as Italy,^[15] Australia,^[16] and the U.S.^[17] The Netherlands has cancelled their F-35 order altogether.^[18] This means that the F-35 will likely cost more than current projections estimate. If other countries are rethinking or outright abandoning their F-35 purchases, Canada should take note and conduct serious review of alternatives.

 

Factor 2: Performance

 

With regard to specifications, the Gripen and Eurofighter are about equal, save for the fact that the Saab has obtained AESA radar^[19], an asset the Eurofighter currently lacks^[20], and the Gripen is a single engine fighter whereas the Eurofighter is a twin engine fighter. They both have similar power-to-weight ratios and wing loading capacities and, although the Eurofighter enjoys a very slight advantage, they are so close in performance that any advantage enjoyed by the Eurofighter is negligible, particularly when compared to the vast difference in price. Both fighters have very similar, armament, top speed, capacity, fuel capacity, range, sensor technology, sensor fusion, helmet-mounted display, situational awareness, speed, and manoeuvrability. American General John Jumper is the only person to have flown the Eurofighter and the U.S.A.'s top air superiority fighter, the F-22A, and was quoted as saying, "I've flown all the [American] Air Force jets. None was as good as the Eurofighter."^[21] The key difference is that the Eurofighter costs $65 million more per plane, but does not deliver an additional $65 million worth of improved performance over the Gripen. Both are very impressive and capable fighters. Though equal in performance, the cost of the Gripen makes it the clear winner.

 

By comparison, the F-35A is a poor performer. It is not designed to include supercruise capability^[22] and can only maintain supercruise for a mere 241km.^[23] Both the Gripen and Eurofighter have full supercruise capability at mach 1.2.^{[24] [25]} The F-35A is also slow by fighter jet standards. With a top speed of 1,930kmph^[26] (mach 1.6), it lags far behind the Gripen, Eurofighter, which can both reach speeds above mach 2.^{[27] [28]} The F-35A is even slower than the Super Hornet^[29] and F-16 Fighting Falcon^[30] it is meant to replace.

 

Manoeuvrability is also an issue with the F-35A.^[31] Its small wing design does not allow for quick manoeuvres using tight turn radii.^[32] The Gripen and Eurofighter excel in the area of manoeuvrability,^[33] providing an additional advantage in a combat situation.

 

Though the fact that the Gripen is a single engine fighter might be seen as a disadvantage, the fact that the Canadian government was so eager to procure the F-35A indicates that the single/twin engine difference is not a significant factor.

 

Another disadvantage that reduces the F-35A's capabilities is its limited internal weapons capacity. With four internal hardpoints, the F-35A cannot deliver nearly as much in payload, particularly when compared to the Russian Su-35, which has twelve hardpoints^[34], the Eurofighter, which has thirteen hardpoints^[35], and the NG Gripen, which will have twelve hardpoints.^[36] The F-35A can carry additional fuel and weapons externally using its six external hardpoints, but this negates the F-35A's already questionable stealth advantage, which is examined later, and would not be advisable in a combat situation.

 

Factor 3: Compatibility and Weapons Capacity

 

The F-35A cannot yet carry the upcoming MBDA Meteor air-to-air missile; the most advanced NATO compatible air-to-air missile in the world, which is a major disadvantage in air-to-air combat, particularly in terms of engaging a target that is beyond visual range.^[37] Plans to modify the MBDA Meteor to fit into the F-35A's internal weapons bays have been proposed, but these plans are uncertain and adds to the already monstrous price tag. The Gripen and Eurofighter are both already compatible with the MBDA Meteor, along with virtually every other NATO compatible weapon available, giving them a significant combat advantage over the F-35A. Even if an F-35A compatible version of the Meteor is developed in the future, that would not increase the capability of F-35A to such an extent as to justify the exorbitant price and poor performance in other areas.

 

The F-35A also cannot carry the AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missile as it does not fit in the internal weapons bay. It can be equipped on one of the external hardpoints, but this greatly diminishes what little stealth advantage the F-35A enjoys. In order to use internal weapons to take out ground-based targets, Canada would have to buy the Brimestone air-to-ground missile, pushing the cost of operating the F-35A beyond its already unreasonable figure.

 

This means that on retirement of the CF-18s, all ammunition that is not compatible with the F-35A's internal weapons bay becomes practically useless. The RCAF would have to spend additional funds to purchase new ammunition that is compatible for use on the F-35A. However, the KPMG report states that the ammunition budget will be slashed from $270 million to $52 million,^[38] which significantly limits the quality and quantity of ammunition Canada could acquire. The RCAF would have the funds to buy and maintain fighter jets, but lack the funds to actually arm them. A fighter jet without weapons is not good for anything other than giving the enemy target practice. The Gripen and the Eurofighter are compatible with all the weapons Canada currently stock piles, the future MBDA Meteor, and every other NATO compatible weapon. As the Gripen costs substantially less, the ammunition budget would not have to be reduced, providing Canada's forces with the greatest flexibility to provide the right weapons for whatever task is at hand.

 

The F-35A also presents a problem in terms of integration into Canada's existing air-infrastructure due to its method of midair refuelling: the "flying boom" method. The flying boom method is only used by the U.S. Air Force. Virtually every other air force in the world, including Canada, uses the "probe-and-drogue" method^[39]. Canada's CF-18s and CC-150 Polaris aerial tankers^[40] use this method. An off-the-lot purchase of F-35As would mean Canada could not refuel its fighters midair and they would have to land for refuelling, use an allied or private midair refuelling tanker, or be modified to use the probe-and-drogue method. Landing to refuel is impractical and severely limits Canada's operational capacity due to its inflexibility. Using an allied or private midair refuelling tanker adds to the already exorbitant costs and means Canada cannot operate its fighter jet fleet independently. It reduces Canada's operational flexibility by an unreasonable degree. Modifying the F-35A to use a probe-and-drogue system is possible, but it adds to the ever-increasing costs. As the a Canadian procurement of the F-35A would result in the infrastructure upgrade budget being slashed from $400 million to $244 million^[41] funds to solve the midair refueling problem would be scarce. Much like with the limited weapons capacity and compatibility problem, not only could Canada not afford to arm a fleet of F-35As properly, it could also not afford to refuel them using its existing infrastructure and equipment. The Eurofighter and the Gripen do not have these problems as they are compatible with all NATO weapons and the probe-and-drogue method. The Eurofighter and Gripen are equal in terms of compatibility, but the Gripen is the clear winner due to the fact that it is half the cost.

 

Factor 4: Sensors and Situational Awareness

 

Part of the reason the F-35A was developed was to provide excellent situational awareness to the pilot. This is achieved through a wide range of sensors, data link capability, sensor fusion, Link 16 data link, and a helmet mounted display. The Gripen C/D already offers all these features^[42] and the NG Gripen will expand and improve on them.^[43] For example, the NG Gripen will include the ES-05 Raven AESA radar^[44], an upgrade over the C/D Gripen's PS-05/A radar. The Eurofighter offers a similar sensor suite, but lacks the AESA radar that the Gripen and F-35A possess. The Eurofighter and Gripen lack the F-35A's MADL data link, but it is of primary use for stealth aircraft and its usefulness compared to cost is questionable. The F-35A's sensor features, while impressive on paper, have yet to be fully developed and are still being tested. The Eurofighter and Gripen sensor suites have been more thoroughly tested, so their capabilities are firmly known. The F-35A's sensor technology is not so significant that it justifies the overall poorer performance in other areas and the vastly increased cost. It comes back to the cost-to-performance ratio. The F-35A simply costs too much and delivers too little.

 

About the Author:

Kyle Meema teaches business and law. In 2014, he expects to obtain his Master's in Air and Space Law from Leiden University in the Netherlands.

 

To Be Continued Tuesday on Defence Watch.

 

Footnotes:

[1] http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2012/12/13/pol-F-35A-reaction-thursday.html

[2]

http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post:34903d28-5d5a-4d03-99cc-6c12038c0ab4

[3] http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?id=1065926038

[4] “Management of the Typhoon Project” National Audit Office, United Kingdom, March 2011.

[5] http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120210-115.pdf

[6] http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/12/12/pol-F-35A-kpmg-report-release.html

[7] http://www.defesanet.com.br/gripen/noticia/7669/GRIPEN—A-ticket-to-the-future

[8] http://www.defesanet.com.br/gripen/noticia/7669/GRIPEN—A-ticket-to-the-future

[9] http://www.defesanet.com.br/gripen/noticia/7669/GRIPEN—A-ticket-to-the-future

[10] http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/12/12/pol-F-35A-kpmg-report-release.html

[11] 18, 000 / 21, 000 x 100 = 0.85 or 85% http://www.defesanet.com.br/gripen/noticia/7669/GRIPEN—A-ticket-to-the-future

[12] (36, 800, 000, 000 x 0.85) / 65 x 72 = 34, 648, 615, 370

[13] 4, 700 / 21, 000 x 100 = 0.15 or 15% http://www.defesanet.com.br/gripen/noticia/7669/GRIPEN—A-ticket-to-the-future

[14] (36, 800, 000, 000 x 0.15) / 65 x 150 = 12, 738, 461, 540

[15] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-15/italy-to-cut-F-35A-fighter-jet-orders-as-part-of-defense-revamp.html

[16] http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/01/30/australia-defence-aircraft.html

[17] http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/01/30/australia-defence-aircraft.html

[18] http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2012/07/10/dutch-parliamentarians-vote-to-pull-out-of-F-35A-program-lockheed-martin-still-optimistic-netherlands-will-buy-the-jsf/

[19] http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-jas39-gripen-swedens-4th-generation-wild-card-02401/

[20] AESA Radar is planned to be introduced for the Eurofighter in 2015 http://www.defencetalk.com/eurofighter-and-euroradar-to-develop-latest-generation-aesa-radar-27605/

[21] http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2004/08/17/Analysis-Gun-no-bullets-for-UKs-Eurofighter/UPI-55621092765478/

[22] http://www.jsf.mil/contact/con_faqs.htm

[23] http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/November%202012/1112fighter.aspx

[24] http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/saabs-demo-aircraft-to-highlight-gripen-ng-capabilities-223299/

[25] http://www.eurofighter.com/capabilities/technology/design-features.html

[26] http://defensetech.org/2011/11/07/F-35A-joint-strike-fighter-hits-max-speed/

[27] http://www.globalaircraft.org/planes/saab_39_gripen.pl

[28] http://www.globalaircraft.org/planes/eurofighter.pl

[29] http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1200&ct=1

[30] http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=103

[31] http://www.brighthub.com/science/aviation/articles/92292.aspx

[32] http://manglermuldoon.blogspot.ca/2011/08/f-35-maneuverability-woes.html

[33] Williams, Mel, ed. Superfighters: The Next Generation of Combat Aircraft. London: AIRtime Publishing Inc., 2002. ISBN 1-880588-53-6. (page 82)

[34] http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/su-35/su-354.html

[35] http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/ef2000/

[36] http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/air-force-gives-gripen-fightersecond-chance/390634/

[37] http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/picture-mbda-reveals-clipped-fin-meteor-for-F-35A-347416/

[38] http://o.canada.com/2012/12/20/military-will-contract-out-air-to-air-refuelling-if-canada-goes-with-f-35/

[39] http://www2.macleans.ca/2011/01/31/canadian-military-unable-to-refuel-new-jets-in-mid-air/

[40] http://www2.macleans.ca/2011/01/31/canadian-military-unable-to-refuel-new-jets-in-mid-air/

[41] http://o.canada.com/2012/12/20/military-will-contract-out-air-to-air-refuelling-if-canada-goes-with-F-35A/

[42]http://www.saabgroup.com/en/Air/Avionics_Systems/Avionics_Equipment/EP_17_Gripen_Display_System_HUD/Features

[43] http://www.xairforces.net/newsd.asp?newsid=284&newst=8

[44] http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-jas39-gripen-swedens-4th-generation-wild-card-02401/

 

 

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