英國의 F-35C 구입 관련 영국 감사원 (NAO) 보고서

 

(영국 NAO 보고서 전문은 별도로 소개할 예정 입니다. 아래 내용 역시 추가할 예정 입니다.)

 

 

Work in Progress

The U.K.’s switch to F-35C JSF triggers new concerns

Aviation Week & Space Technology, 07/11/2011

Author : Robert Wall

 

Uncertainty over the U.K.’s plans to reconstitute its carrier strike capability by the end of the decade will persist for at least another year.

 

The British government’s decision to allow an almost decade-long gap in its carrier strike capability remains the most controversial outcome of last year’s Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR). The decision was made to help plug a massive budget shortfall, but combat operations in Libya have prompted critics to argue that the choice was foolish.

 

In a new report, the National Audit Office (NAO) suggests that the road map for rebuilding the carrier strike capability also remains fraught with technical and financial uncertainties. The Defense Ministry “does not have a clear view on the costs and significant military risks associated with regenerating carrier strike capability,” the NAO states. The SDSR changes should see the U.K. build both carriers that were planned and convert one to operate the Lockheed Martin F-35C Joint Strike Fighter, which will now be acquired instead of the F‑35B short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing version. A decision on what to do with the other carrier, which will be placed in yet-to-be-defined extended readiness once built, will be made later.

 

Moreover, the auditors raise the prospect that “continuing difficulties the [Defense Ministry] is facing in balancing its budget leaves carrier strike vulnerable to further changes in strategic direction as a result of broader corporate decisions to address this generic problem.”

 

Margaret Hodge, who chairs Parliament’s Committee of Public Accounts, warns that “there are new cost and value for money risks which have yet to be quantified and which in the current financial climate are clearly unaffordable.” And, she fears, “the carriers may once again be a victim of the need to balance the books in the short term.” But Peter Luff, minister for defense equipment, support and technology, flatly asserts that “we are committed to building the two carriers.”

 

The NAO report provides a mixed review of the decision to shift the fighter to be bought to the JSF C model. The financial watchdog points out that the move results in the U.K. buying a more capable aircraft, but the switch “has introduced six new areas of risk” and the Defense Ministry “has not yet generated quantitative assessments of the risk impacts and, consequently, has not fully costed them or put funded mitigation plans in place.” That assessment should be completed by year-end.

 

The risk areas spotlighted are:

 

• How well will the F-35C performance, optimized for U.S. carriers, fit on the U.K. carrier design from a safety and airframe-life perspective?

 

• Will F-35 buddy refueling be provided in case carrier landings are impeded?

 

• What is the program risk from the lack of a formal U.K. F-35C requirement?

 

• How will cooperation to build up flat-deck carrier operational experience evolve with the U.S. Navy?

 

• How will the Defense Ministry deal with the F-35 test program, having bought three F-35Bs and now negotiating conversion of one of them to a C?

 

• How will U.K.-unique weapons be integrated?

 

On the positive side, the auditors note that the move to the F-35C allows the ministry to cover a capability gap stemming from last year’s decision to cancel the Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability requirement. Cutting that requirement generated £1 billion ($1.6 billion) in long-term savings, but left an operational gap as long as the F-35B was being acquired. The F-35C can now cover that shortfall.

 

The NAO report also spells out the much lower aircraft-sortie rate the U.K. will experience as a result of current plans to have only 12 F-35s at sea using one operationally deployable carrier. Rather than being able to generate 73 sorties per day using 36 aircraft, the carriers will likely be able to generate only 20 sorties. What’s more, average at-sea time would drop to 150-200 days from 435 if two carriers are built and made fully operational. The NAO points out that the sortie rate could increase, again, since the carriers are being configured to accommodate 36 JSFs, if such an acquisition decision is made.

 

The JSF inventory will likely be higher eventually than initially spelled out, however. Speaking at the Royal United Services Institute, Air Commo. Malcolm Brecht, director of the Air Staff, said the Joint Combat Aircraft — as the JSF is called in the U.K. — “will form 25% of the overall combat air force by 2020.”

 

To operate with only one carrier properly operational, the U.K. plans to work closely with the French and U.S. navies; but the NAO report warns that “the feasibility of flying the JSF carrier variant from the French carrier and the French aircraft [the Rafale] from the United Kingdom carrier is as yet unclear.”

 

Critics of the current approach point to the Libyan conflict and argue that it underscores the short-sightedness of allowing a capability gap by retiring the carrier force and the Harrier GR9 fleet.

 

But Luff rejects that view. While he concedes the decision to scrap the existing carriers was difficult, and that they likely would have been used in Libya if available, the Tornado and Typhoons flying out of southern Italy are doing the job better than the Harrier force would have. In particular, he points to the heavy use of the Dual-Mode Brimstone from the Tornado GR4; that weapon was not integrated on the Harrier GR9.

 

Another point of contention for Hodge is the NAO finding that canceling the two carriers on contract would have generated savings of up to £1.2 billion. The government, when it presented its carrier plans, said the contract structure in place with BAE Systems meant that the cancellation cost would have been higher than that of completing the program in a modified form.

 

 

  F-35C CF-02 ⓒ Lockheed Martin

 

  F-35C CF-03 ⓒ Lockheed Martin